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I. INTRODUCTION
The underlying foundation of federal income taxation, namely a tax on
individual or corporate income, motivates taxpayers to reduce taxable income
and therefore reduce taxes.' The progressive nature of the rate structure
further aggravates this motivation because taxpayers strive for income
Candidate, J.D., University of Miami School of Law, 2005; B.A., Tufts University, 2002. I
would like to thank Professor Michael Froomkin, Ben Milch, Lee Milich, and any others who helped
contribute to my article.
I See Stuart L Rosow, The Taxation of Economic Reality The Role of Anti-Abuse Rules in Tax
Administration, 571 PLIJTAx 583, 587 (2003).
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income classifications in lower tax brackets.2 Taxpayers regularly make
transactional decisions that are motivated, either in whole or in part, by the
amount of tax savings achieved. Many of these activities are performed in
a legitimate means of tax reduction, tax avoidance, or tax shelter schemes.3
From an Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") perspective, problems arise when
these schemes are so significant that they effectuate an abuse on the system
of taxation. Federal securities laws, IRS regulations, and American Bar
Association ("ABA") rules have responded to these abusive tax shelter
schemes by requiring certain disclosures, registrations, and listings. These
reforms have also led to a variety of guidelines to determine which shelters
are defined as abusive.4 The main parties subject to reforms are corporate or
individual taxpayers, accountants, and attorneys. Tax lawyers involved in tax
shelter schemes are in a peculiar position that arguably creates conflicts
between some of these regulations and their duties to clients.
This article analyzes the conflict between the manner in which regula-
tions impose an implicit duty upon lawyers to protect the integrity of the
federal income tax system while the profession imposes duties upon lawyers
to protect client interests and information.- Conflicts arise when client
interests are not aligned with the interests of the tax system, which is
perhaps the norm rather than the exception. The legal profession operates
in a self-regulated fashion by adopting Model Rules or Model Codes that
outline the boundaries of lauryering.
Tax lawyers have historically argued that tax shelter information is
protected under Rule 1.6 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct,7
entitled "Confidentiality of Information." Nevertheless, the ABA House of
Delegates debated the possibility of amending Rule 1.6 to include permissive
disclosures for fraud that creates financial injury. During their Annual
Meeting in August 2003, the House of Delegates decided to pass amend-
ments to Rule 1.6 to broaden the scope of permissive disclosure for fraud.'
Arguably these changes were adopted to hold attorneys more accountable to
2 "A progressive income tax is one with rates that rise as income rises." WILLIAM A. KLEIN ET
AL., FEDERAL INCOME TAx 13 (13th ed. 2003).
3 See id. at 532.
4 See Rosow, supra note 1.
5 See R.J. Ruble, The Professional Responsibilities of a Tax Lawyer in the Context of Corporate Tax
Shelters, 554 PLI/TAX 913, 917 (2002).
6 SeeDEBORAHL. RHODE&GEOFFREYC. HAZARDJR., PROFESSIONALRESPONSIBILITYAND
REGULATION 9-10 (3d ed. 2002).
7 Model Rules of Professional Conduct used herein are as amended in 2003 from the 2001
version. Reference to the newly amended Model Rule 1.6 is an additional change in August 2003 to the
published 2003 version of Model Rules.
8 See ABA House of Delegates Resolution to Report 119A, Aug. 11-12,2003.
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third parties when clients engage in crimes or frauds that are likely to
financially injure those third parties. The changes to Rule 1.6 mark a drastic
shift in how tax lawyers' conflicting interests (tax system versus client) are
weighed. The Rule effectively places a looming shadow over the paramount
duty to protect client interests, thereby giving the tax system interests more
weight.
The question now becomes whether or not the changes to Rule 1.6 will,
in turn, create changes in how tax lawyers approach tax shelters and tax
shelter clients. In short, the answer is no. Tax lawyers who create tax
shelters will continue to use principles of confidentiality regardless of the
changes because the possibility of a situation fitting within the narrow con-
fines of Rule 1.6 is rare. This article will first outline tax shelter schemes
and the problems that abusive tax shelters schemes pose to the system of
taxation. Next, this article will discuss the anti-abuse rules and regulations
that have developed in response to abusive tax shelters. The third section
explores the depths of Model Rule 1.6 and how the Rule has been changed.
Finally, the article will analyze the implications of Rule 1.6 for tax attorneys
and conclude with suggestions for improvement.
II. TAx SHELTERS AND THE PROBLEMS WITH ABUSE
Tax shelters are generally understood to be transactions or activities that
have significant tax benefits. According to ABA Formal Opinion 346
(revised), as tax shelter is:
an investment which has a significant feature for federal income or
excise tax purposes either or both of the following attributes: (1)
deductions in excess income from the investment being available in
any year to reduce income from other sources in that year, and (2)
credits in excess of the tax attributable to the income from the
investment being available in any year to offset taxes on income
from other sources in that year.9
Tax shelters are often grouped into three categories: deferral, conversion,
and tax arbitrage.' Shelters achieve deferral if current period income can be
shifted into a future period, thus delaying the time period for which taxes are
due." Deferral schemes might also be used for losses, allowing taxpayers to
9 ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 346 (1982).
to See KLEIN ET AL., supra note 2, at 533.
11 See id.
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offset years with high income to years with losses. Conversion shelters
allow taxpayers to change income from one classification to another. This
leads to changes in income tax rate structures. 12 One commonly sought con-
version tries to change ordinary income into capital gain income. Tax
arbitrage results from transactions that create deductible expenses, which are
paired against tax-favorable income.' 3 The aforementioned schemes can be
used legitimately or can be used to abuse the tax system. Common parlance
of tax shelters incorrectly assumes that all tax planning is abusive and therefore
an illegal shelter. The guidelines that determine which tax shelters are
abusive will be further discussed when this article explores anti-abuse mea-
sures.
A. Tax Shelter Packages
Tax lawyers may be asked to develop tax shelters, evaluate shelters, or
issue tax opinions on the propriety of tax shelters. 4 The latter task is the
most common out of these three activities. Frequently, tax lawyers will be
instrumental in both developing a shelter transaction and issuing a tax
opinion on the tax shelter.'" In these cases, accounting firms and law firms
work together to turn tax shelter schemes into a marketable product. 6
Accounting firms and law firms have found a lucrative niche for their tax
expertise: selling tax shelter packages to large corporations. Reading the
Internal Revenue Code closely, these professionals arrange a variety of
complex transactions that can generate gains or losses that create a favorable
impact on reportable financial statements without falling in the realm of
illegal dealings. 7 Oftentimes accounting firms will create, market, and sell
these tax schemes to companies without outside assistance from lawyers.
Lately, however, accounting firms have developed joint ventures with law
firms to create a packaged deal that includes an attorney's legal opinion that
the shelter is viable.'" In this context, accountants and attorneys are often
grouped together and classified as promoters or organizers. 9
The packaged tax scheme includes proposals, forecasts, and entity
development by accounting firms accompanied by attorney assertion that the
12 See id.
13 See id.
14 See id. at 546-47.
15 See Frederic G. Corneel, Guidelines to Tax Practice Third, 57 TAX LAW. 181, 183 (Fall 2003).
16 See id. at 192.
17 See KLEIN ET AL., supra note 2, at 546-47.
18 See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 346 (1982).
19 See id.; I.R.C. S 6111 (1994).
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entire shelter has legal propriety.20 Tax shelters sold as a package ideally reap
the highest monetary advantage for all parties involved. The corporations
sculpt their financial statements into desired numbers, the accountants are
paid for their expertise, and the attorneys are paid for their legal opinion.
Naturally, packaged tax shelters sell at much higher premiums than simply
selling a tax shelter scheme. 1
B. Contextual Backdrop
Before delving into the regulations on tax shelters and tax lawyers, it is
helpful to set the stage with three vivid examples of current concerns.
Recent events in the corporate community have spurred newsworthy stories
about corporate crime and fraud.22 These stories have regularly been in the
press because of the financial repercussions upon third parties, generally
public investors. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act was largely a response to these
cases in an effort to create more strict controls for the future. 23 Two notable
cases are the corporate bankruptcies of Enron and WorldCom.
Large corporations need some structure of legal guidance, advice, or
counseling. Enron and WorldCom both had teams of legal professionals and
accountants issuing guidance and counseling that eventually led to the
corporate downfall. 24 As such, the legal and accounting professions have
responded to these debacles by instituting new rules, codes, and regulations
through the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, ABA,
Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC"), and IRS.2' Historically,
attorneys have regulated themselves by enacting codes of conduct and ethical
standards.26 The push for the August 2003 amendments to the ABA Model
Rules is an effort to continue self-regulation before outside organizations
such as the SEC start imposing more stringent regulations upon attorneys.
Although the Enron and WorldCom cases provide excellent examples
of current corporate problems, the cases do little to shed light on tax shelters
specifically. Therefore, the third case study unpacks the nuances of tax
20 See Sheryl Stratton, Clients Sue E&Y and Two Law Firms over Tax Shelter, 2002 TAX NOTES
TODAY 249-1 (Dec. 27, 2002).
21 For example, the Jenkens & Gilchrist tax shelter cost approximately $9-10 million. See id.
22 See id.; Eric Berger, Enron Creditor Says Lawyers Have Conflict; Milbank, Tweed Workedfor Units
Connected to the Firm, THE HOUSTON CHRONICLE, Mar. 21, 2002 at 4.
23 See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 SS 201-409, 15 U.S.C. SS 7219-7265 (2002).
24 See Berger, supra note 22. See also In re WorldCom, No. 02 Civ. 3288, 2003 WL 21488087
(S.D.N.Y. June 25, 2003).
25 See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of2002 §§ 201-409,15 U.S.C. SS 7219-7265 (2002); MODEL RULES
OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (Aug. 2003).
26 See RHODE & HAZARD, supra note 6, at 8-11.
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shelter packages by looking at a packaging scheme used by the accounting
firm Ernst & Young in conjunction with legal opinions by the law firm of
Jenkens & Gilchrist. The following three cases outline the current issues
debated by legislatures, the Service, and the ABA.
1. ENRON
Enron Corporation was engaged in insider trading, was heavily debt
leveraged, and used risky derivative financing through special purpose
entities. 27 The vast majority of these transactions were reported "Off
Balance Sheet."21 In other words, the transactions purportedly did not
change the asset or debt levels of the parent company and allowed the finan-
cial statements to reflect large gains on the income statements and cash flow
statements. The combination of these transactions led to Enron's ultimate
bankruptcy and a large class action suit based on securities fraud.29 The law
firm ofMilbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy (hereinafter "Milbank Tweed")
helped Enron structure some of these complex financial tactics that camou-
flaged the debt leverage and other controversial instruments since the law
firm represented the large banks that were providing the financing.30
Milbank Tweed has met much opposition by the public due to the firm's
three potentially conflicting roles in the case: as a creditor, a defendant in the
class action, and counsel to creditors committee.31
Milbank Tweed first played the role of a creditor seeking money for
legal fees from the bankruptcy estate. Milbank Tweed assisted Enron in
developing these schemes prior to bankruptcy for steep legal fees. Some of
these fees were paid to the law firm just before Enron made its bankruptcy
filing.32 Under the Bankruptcy Code, money paid out to any party imme-
diately before bankruptcy is subject to scrutiny by the bankruptcy trustee
and could potentially be reverted back to bankruptcy estate if found to be
preferential 33-preferential treatment immediately before bankruptcy can
effectively eliminate money that would otherwise have gone to unsecured
creditors.34 After hearing arguments that Milbank Tweed benefited from
preferential treatment, a court ordered Milbank Tweed to repay those legal
27 See In re Enron Corp. Sec. Litig., 206 F.R.D. 427 (S.D. Tex. 2002).
28 See id.
2 See id.
30 See Berger, supra note 22.
31 See id.
32 See id.
33 See Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. S 547(b) (1994).
34 See ROBERT L. JORDAN ET AL., COMMERCIAL LAW 582-83 (5th ed. 2000).
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fees to the trustee in bankruptcy.35 This left Milbank Tweed as a general
creditor subject to the limitations of the bankruptcy estate and constrained
by other creditors that have priority.
A second role played by Milbank Tweed was that of a defendant to the
class action against Enron by shareholders. 36  Milbank Tweed arguably
enabled Enron to perpetuate a scheme against its shareholders to hide heavy
debt-leveraged financing.37 As a defendant in the shareholder derivative suit,
Milbank Tweed was arguably materially limited from effectively serving its
multiple roles in the case.38 Milbank Tweed was further entrenched in this
direct conflict since the firm also worked with the banks that enabled Enron
to become so debt leveraged.39
Thirdly, Milbank Tweed actively sought to play the role of counsel to
the creditors committee.' As counsel, Milbank Tweed possessed a fiduciary
duty to the creditors to ensure each creditor received the greatest amount of
return possible. Unsurprisingly, this role is the most controversial since a
number of conflicts can arise from the other positions Milbank Tweed plays.
After a challenge for disqualification, a judge ruled that Milbank Tweed
made enough disclosures and firewalls to maintain the firm's distance from
conflicts of interest.41 The test for disqualification of creditors' committee
counsel is "disinterestedness" and showing a lack of conflicts of interest can
rebut this test.42
Interestingly, the amendments to Model Rule 1.6 regarding permissive
disclosure were passed in response to this kind of conflict of interest situa-
tions.43 The basic idea is that the Enron bankruptcy could have been pre-
vented if attorneys had been capable of disclosing information.44 However,
there is another underlying societal interest in holding parties responsible for
tragedies like Enron. Society recognizes that the Enron bankruptcy has
35 Milbank Pays Out to Enron Debtors, THE LAWYER, March 17, 2003 at 3.
36 See Paul Braverman, Who Enabled the Enablers? Enron Investigations Have Bankers Dodging Bullets,
and if the Banker's Attorneys are Next, Inquiries may Focus on Big New York Firm, 77 DAILYBUSINESS REVIEW
(M AmI, FL) 85, Oct. 9,2002, at A7. See also Associated Press Wire, Four New Defendants Named in Enron
Shareholder Lawsuit (Jan. 9, 2004), http//www.miami.com/md/miamiherald/news/breaking_news/
7674020.htm (naming Milbank Tweed as a defendant in the shareholder derivative suit).
37 See Braverman, supra note 36. See also Four New Defendants Named in Enron ShareholderLawsuit,
supra note 36, http://www.miami.com/mld/miamiherad/news/breakingnews/7674020.htm.
38 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7(a)(2) (2003).
39 Braverman, supra note 36.
4 See N.Y Judge Finds Milbank Disclosed Enough To Represent Creditors Committee, 12 No. 8
ANDREWS' PROF'L LIAB. LITIG. REP. 3 (Feb. 2003).
41 See id. (citing In re Enron Corp., No. 02-5638 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2003)).
42 See Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. S 327 (2004).
43 See ABA Task Force on Corporate Responsibility, Report 119A (March 31, 2003).
44 See id.
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properly held corporate officers and company auditors responsible, but has
left the attorneys virtually untouched (with the possible exception of Vincent
& Elkins). 4' Arguably, the August amendments to Model Rule 1.6 would
have imposed a duty upon Milbank Tweed to disclose information about the
financial schemes before theywere even perpetrated-placing more respon-
sibility on Milbank Tweed to abate similar situations.
2. WORLDCOM
Another great example of corporate fraud is WorldCom, Inc.'s stock
fraud case. Since the accounting firm of Arthur Anderson, LLP was a key
player in both Enron and WorldCom, analyzing the WorldCom case will
help understand auditor liability and responsibilities.
Arthur Anderson audited and perhaps enabled WorldCom to hide over
$3.8 billion from investors. 46 It was Arthur Anderson's responsibility to
ensure the audit report was signed and to certify that the financial statements
correctly reflected the company's financial position.47 There are no mechan-
isms within the field of accounting that serve to protect auditors from third
parties who rely upon the audit report because the purpose of the report is
to make such assurances. Additionally, there is nothing to prevent investiga-
tors from searching auditor documents.48 Thus, auditors are in the unenvied
position of being held responsible by third parties without being able to find
any protection in concepts such as confidentiality or privilege.
On June 25, 2003 the Southern District of New York ruled on several
motions to dismiss in the WorldCom lawsuit, including one for Arthur
Anderson.49 All of the motions to dismiss were granted except Arthur
Anderson's motion.50 The court found that Arthur Anderson possessed the
requisite scienter for securities fraud because the firm had unlimited access to
records, and because the firm had an understanding of the financial signifi-
cance of such questionable treatment of acquisitions."1 Therefore, much of
the blame fell upon the auditor's shoulders.
45 See Neal Batson, Second Interim Report of Neal Batson, Court-Appointed Reporter (Jan. 21, 2003),
httpV//www.enron.concorp/por/pdfs/examiner2/InterimReport2ofExaminer.pdf.
46 See Mark Hamblett, WorldCom Civil Actions Take Shape Under Judge Cote, 229 N.Y.L.J. 1
(2003).
47 Int'l Standards on Auditing §§ 8100-8260, 2 Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants Profl
Standards 12,083-12,191 (2001).
48 See U.S. v. ArthurYoung&Co., 465 U.S. 805(1984) (rejectinganargument that accountant's
work papers fall within the work-product immunity afforded to attorneys).
49 See In re WorldCom, No. 02 Civ. 3288, 2003 WL 21488087 (S.D.N.Y. June 25, 2003).
50 See id.
51 See id.
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So, why does Arthur Anderson suffer such drastic penalties while law
firms such as Milbank Tweed are barely implicated? The brunt of the
answer lies in the acceptance of attorney-client privilege and the concept of
confidentiality. Lawyers' roles as counselors, advocates, and advisors require
open communication lines between lawyers and their clients. In essence,
the reliance upon attorney-client privilege is grounded upon the concept that
clients will be more frank and candid with their attorneys if there is some
semblance of a guarantee that the information will remain confidential.52
This rule is effectively embodied in Model Rule 1.6. Additionally, attorneys
are shielded to a certain extent for their documents that satisfy the work-
product doctrine.5'
The work product doctrine allows lawyers to protect documents pre-
pared in anticipation of litigation from discovery.54 Accountants are tradi-
tionally not afforded the same privilege. Even an accountant's workpapers
(which are quite analogous to attorney work product) are not protected
under the work product doctrine.55 The rationale is based on the lawyer's
roles to advise and advocate versus the accountant's role to protect the
public.
Perhaps the determinative factor in locating blame is how we define
responsibilities for accountants as opposed to attorneys. Accountants who
serve as auditors are predominately responsible to the third party investors
who rely upon the audit report as an assurance that the company is finan-
cially stable. Attorneys, on the other hand, are responsible to their clients,
third parties, the court, and the system ofjustice s6 Hence, attorneys can
shield themselves from scrutiny by invoking the attorney-client privilege if
they find their responsibilities to their clients outweigh any other respon-
sibilities they may have to third parties, the court, or the system ofjustice.
The fact that Model Rule 1.6 allows attorneys to make this decision (rather
than third parties) is controversial because attorneys might always choose
nondisclosure. There are, however, cases that show permissive disclosure is
based upon a reasonableness standard, and that an attorney should have dis-
closed.57
52 See GEOFFREYC. HAzARDS,JR., SuSAN P. KONIAK&ROGERC. CRAMTON, THE LAWAND
ETHICS OF LAWYERING 204 (3d ed. 1999).
53 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS SS 87-90 (2000). See alsoJeffA.
Anderson et al., Special Project: The Work Product Doctrine, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 760 (1983).
54 See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947) (allowing attorneys to retain a level of
confidentiality for their work product).
5 See Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. at 805.
56 See RHODE & HAZARD, supra note 6, at 41-46.
57 See McClure v. Thompson, 323 F.3d 1233 (9th Cir. 2003).
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3. JENKENS & GILCRIST
At the end of 2002, four individuals who used a tax shelter package
created by Ernst &Young sued the accounting firm and two other law firms
that marketed the shelter." The law firms engaged in the transaction were
Jenkens & Gilchrist and Sidley Austin Brown & Wood ("Sidley Austin"). 59
Basically, the four individuals founded a computer distributorship company
that had a taxable capital gain of $70 million in 1999.60 The accounting firm
Ernst & Young, in conjunction with law firms Jenkens & Gilchrist and
Sidley Austin, developed a tax shelter designed to create a large, reportable
financial loss to offset the capital gain. The strategy is called a Currency
Options Bring Reward Alternatives ("COBRA") scheme. 6' The COBRA,
under these particularized facts, allowed the main company's individual
owners to set up a series of six pass-through entities that used the variable
changes in selling short options on the foreign currency market to generate
a large loss that was then converted back to the main company to increase its
basis. 62 The tax shelter here was a typical packaged deal whereby the
accounting firm devised the plan and both of the law firms affirmed its
propriety. The attorneys asserted that the COBRA scheme fell outside of
the general definition of a tax shelter for reporting purposes and thus was
properly not registered.' 3
To get a sense of the value of tax packages, the accounting and legal fees
paid by these four individuals are worth noting. First, before being told
about the mechanics behind their COBRA scheme, the individuals were
required to pay $1,056,000 (nonrefundable) to Ernst & Young and sign a
nondisclosure agreement. 4 Once using the COBRA scheme, the indivi-
duals paid another $315,000 to the accountants and lawyers based on a per-
centage of the COBRA benefit.65 Additionally, Sidley Austin charged
separate fees of $75,000 for two legal opinion letters. 6 So far, the total of
nearly $1.5 million is essentially only for the tax shelter. In addition to this
$1.5 million, the individuals each paid Jenkens & Gilchrist $2,012,000 for
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legal opinions that verify the propriety of the tax shelter.67 The total ex-
penditure was approximately $9.5 million.
After following the tax shelter package as directed, the four individuals
later found themselves the subject of an audit. Internal Revenue Notice 99-
59 disallows tax shelters that are exclusively used to generate losses.' The
plaintiffs contended that the COBRA used was precisely what the 1999
notice disallowed, and that the accountants and lawyers had knowledge of
this fact.6 9 Arguably, this 1999 notice was too general and vague to be direct-
ly related to the complex COBRA scheme. The greater part of the tax
shelter scheming was accomplished before the end of April 2000. In
September 2000, the IRS issued another notice (2000-44), which more
closely resembled the COBRA scheme, and disallowed it. Once this new
notice was published, however, the law firms did nothing to change their
opinions or modify the tax shelter.7°
John Doe Summonses had been issued upon Ernst &Young,Jenkens &
Gilchrist, and Sidley Austin. Of particular interest are the summons issued
to the law firms since the accounting firms have already agreed to comply
and have historically been compelled to comply. TheJohn Doe Summonses
issued toJenkens & Gilchrist sought a full listing of clients who had been
advised to use the COBRA scheme. The law firm asserted the attorney-
client privilege and presented it as "one of the most respected and important
principles in our nation's legal system." 7' The theory suggests that the
names of clients constitute legal information that is confidential.
Although this article explores the arguments regarding confidentiality in
the context of John Doe Summonses, a constitutional law question bears
mentioning. In the last few months the Supreme Court of the United States
has decided to hear Hiibel v. 6th Judicial District Court of Nevada.72 The main
issue is whether, within the Fourth Amendment right of privacy, an
individual has a right to refuse identification of himself or herself. Since
John Doe Summonses essentially request identification of individuals, the
outcome of Hiibel may weigh heavily on how courts will treat John Doe





71 See Amy Hamilton, Government Seeks Enforcement of Summonses onjenkins & Gilchrist, 2003 TAX
NOTES TODAY 158-1 (Aug. 15, 2003).
72 59 P.3d 1201 (Nev. 2002).
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Ill. ANTI-ABUSE MEASURES
The tax lawyers' rules of practice generally fall under three broad cate-
gories; namely, federal securities laws, IRS regulations, and ABA standards.73
A fourth category not addressed in this article is court decisions. Tax shelter
abuse problems have led to varying degrees of anti-abuse legislation and
regulation throughout the last thirty years. The pivotal Tax Reform Act of
1976 started a generation of abuse-conscious reforms.74 This approach con-
tinued through the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 and the
Tax Reform Act of 1986. s While scholars debate whether the Tax Reform
Act of 1986 marked the end of the era for individual tax shelters, the act was
indisputably a high-water-mark for intolerance of abuses. 7
6
A. Federal Securities Laws
In 2002 Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act ("Act") in response to
securities violations that were largely unmonitored or unenforced. The Act
focuses upon responsibilities of corporate executives, accountants or audi-
tors, and attorneys to report securities fraud and enhance disclosures in
financial reports. In addition, the Act imposes stricter sanctions upon com-
panies and their accountants.
Corporate officers, accountants, and attorneys of publicly traded com-
panies have a variety of heightened requirements under the Act. Corporate
officers are held fully responsible for the information on the financial state-
ments.77 This includes assertions that the officers have reviewed the reports
and implemented effective internal controls.78 The financial statements
must also accurately reflect the corporate officers' actual knowledge of the
company's financial condition. Financial statements are required to be pre-
pared according to generally accepted accounting principles and must in-
clude full and proper disclosures of all material information.7 9 The auditors
must comply with strict adherence to independence, both actual and
73 See R.J. Ruble, The Professional Responsibilities of a Tax Lawyer in the Context of Corporate Tax
Shelters, 571 PLVTax 1039 (June 2003).
74 See Steven C. Saich, Tax Practice Ethics: Practitioner Discipline and Sanctions, SH08OA.L.I.-A.B.A.
543 (2003).
75 See id.
76 See KLEIN ET AL., supra note 2, at 5-6.
7 See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 302, 15 U.S.C. S 7241 (2002).
78 Id.
79 See id. at SS 401-403.
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implied." If auditors wish to engage in other services to the company, such
as tax or bookkeeping, the accounting firm must first register and acquire
pre-approval for such services."' In the event of corporate oversight, fraud,
crime, or white-collar crime, the officers and auditors face risks of criminal
penalties and securities violations. s2
The Act focuses on corporate officers and auditors much more than
attorneys. Attorneys are required to report SEC violations to the highest
corporate officer in the company. 3 This standard is consistent with the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct, which require attorneys to report up
the ladder within the company.8s If the attorney or corporate officer deter-
mines that the problem is persisting, the attorney may report to the audit
committee or board of directors.
B. Internal Revenue Service Regulations
IRS Treasury Circular 230 S 10.33 controls the scope of factual inquiries
and identification of material issues that attorneys must explore regarding tax
shelters.8 6 In general, the attorney must fairly recognize any areas that would
be challenged by the IRS and make basic conclusions on how the tax shelter
will withstand the challenge. 7
Many tax shelters must be registered once the accounting firms or law
firms begin marketing the shelters according to Section 6111(d) of the
Internal Revenue Code ("I.R.C.") (as enacted by the Taxpayer Relief Act of
1997).8 These registration requirements apply to tax shelters that produce
large amounts of deductions or credits.89 The main prong in determining
whether a tax shelter should be registered is whether the shelter has a signifi-
cant tax avoidance purpose.' Additionally, tax shelters may be subject to
disclosure if they are of a certain type or create certain tax effects. 91 Registra-
8o See id. at § 201(a).
81 See id. at S 201.
82 See id. at SS 802-803, 903-904.
83 See id. at S 307.
84 See generally MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13(b)-(c) (Aug. 2003) (directing
attorneys to first find higher authority within an organization before revealing information).
85 See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 S 307.
86 31 C.F.R. S 10.33 (2002).
87 See id.
88 See Matthew A. Stevens, A Brief Overview of the Registration, Listing, and Disclosure Requirements
Under the New Temporary Tax Shelter Regulations, 555 PLI/TAX 431, 439 (2002).
89 See id.
90 See id. at 441.
91 See id. at 470-77.
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tion includes a complete description of the tax shelter and its effects as well
as a list of participants."' Those transactions that do not fall within the
requirements for registration may still be subject to investor list regulations.
Investor lists identify clients that have been sold tax shelters that could be
potentially abusive even though these shelters are not required to be register-
ed.93 Generally, the IRS can request these lists without a summons unless
the attorney can prove an attorney-client privilege exists or that confidential
information cannot be disclosed.94
C. American Bar Association Reforms
The ABA regulates tax lawyers by promulgating formal opinions and by
adopting Model Rules or Model Codes that establish ethical behaviors. ABA
Formal Opinion No. 352 (1985) discusses when tax lawyers can take a
position on the "realistic possibility of success if the matter is litigated" for
tax issues.9 Formal Opinion 85-352 also requires tax lawyers to make these
decisions in good faith. Since Formal Opinion 85-352 does not specify the
authorities lawyers are permitted to rely upon, the 1987 ABA Tax Section
Comments, I.R.C. § 6661, the Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1989, and later
I.R.C. S 6662 developed the types of authorities permitted. 96
Another important ABA Formal Opinion (346) was issued and then
revised in 1982, which is entitled "Tax Law Opinions in Tax Shelter Invest-
ment Offerings. "' This Formal Opinion speaks directly to the most com-
mon tax lawyer duty in the context of tax shelters: legal opinion letters.
Once an attorney is sought to issue an opinion on the tax shelter, ABA
Formal Opinion 346 (Revised) controls the level of diligence the attorney
must meet.98 As a general matter, attorneys who draft opinion letters for tax
matters must have a clear understanding of all of the relevant tax information
with few assumptions. 99 Formal Opinion 346 (Revised) outlines the tax
lawyers' responsibilities such as full disclosures with clients, technical
inquiries of relevant facts, taking reasonable steps in assuring material
9 See id. at 456-57.
93 See id. at 459.
94 See Stevens, supra note 88, at 465-67.
95 See Gersham Goldstein & Christopher Heuer, Ethical Disclosure Requirements in Corporate Tax
Representation, 598 PL/TAX 667 (2003).
9 See Salch, supra note 74.
97 See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Profl Responsibility, Formal Op. 346 (revised 1982).
9 See R.J. Ruble, The Professional Responsibilities of a Tax Lawyer in the Context of Corporate Tax
Shelters, 554 PLVTAx 913, 921-23 (2002).
99 See Frederic G. Corned, Guidelines to Tax Practice Third, 57 TAX LAW. 181, 183-84 (2003).
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information is considered, and separating the differing material tax issues if
differing outcomes result for each."°
The ABA has also begun reformation efforts on the Model Rules or
Model Code of Professional Conduct. That is the focus of this article and
the Model Rules are described more thoroughly in the next sections.
IV. AMERiCAN BAR ASSOCIATION MODEL RULE 1.6
The ABA's Model Rules of Professional Conduct must first pass
through the House of Delegates before being recommended to the states for
adoption.'0 ' As such, many states have Model Rules that vary slightly from
each other because each state may choose the extent it desires to follow the
rules passed by the House. Additionally, states may choose to adopt the
Rules with significant amendments. Historically, lawyers are self-regulated
by individual states rather than by some overarching federal authority or
numerous local authorities.1°2
A. Historical Background
In 1887 the first formal code of ethics was adopted in Alabama. 13 The
profession saw a need to regulate itself to maintain integrity and uphold the
moral tone of the times. The ABA adopted the Canons of Professional
Ethics in 1908, and many states followed the trend." The Canons were
concise statements that provided ethical guidelines for lawyers to follow.
There were 47 Canons by the 1930s." 5 The Canons remained dominant in
the states until the early 1970s when criticisms regarding vagueness over-
whelmed the industry and reforms were sought.
The ABA appointed a committee in 1964 to examine the Canons and
rework the language towards more specificity.' ° 6 The result was the Model
Code of Professional Responsibility, which was adopted by the ABA in
1969.1' Into the 1970s, the Model Code became the law of the land and a
dominant feature in legal practice regulation. The vision of a lawyer under
100 See RJ. Ruble, The Professional Responsibilities of a Tax Lawyer in the Context of Corporate Tax
Shelters, 571 PLN TAX 1039, 1048-49 (2003).
101 See HAZARD, KONIAK & CRAMTON, supra note 52, at 15.
102 See RHODE & HAZARD, supra note 6, at 2.




107 See id. at 13-14.
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the Model Code stresses courtroom advocacy, equality in thejustice system,
and a watchful judge.' These notions became outdated quickly because
attorneys regarded the practice of law as many other things outside the court-
room.
In 1977 the Kutak Commission was created to evaluate the Model Code
and update the language to include a more modern conception of the role
of lawyers. °9 The Kutak Commission decided that the Code was unwork-
able and set out to create a new set of guidelines altogether. The ABA
adopted the Model Rules of Professional Conduct in 1983.110 At this time,
the ABA gave a recommendation to the states that they should replace their
current Model Codes with Model Rules. Currently, 41 states and the
District of Columbia have adopted the Model Rules.
The Ethics 2000 Commission was created in 1998 to consider further
revisions to the Model Rules in order to update the Rules."' The revisions
pertain directly to Model Rule 1.6 and have recently been adopted by the
House of Delegates. Model Rule 1.6 is discussed in greater detail in the next
sections.
B. Recent Changes
Model Rule 1.6 subpart (a) asserts that, "[a] lawyer shall not reveal
information relating to the representation of a client unless the client gives
informed consent."" 2 This section, unlike the other parts of Rule 1.6, has
not been changed, and is generally understood to limit the attorney's dis-
closure to the extent that the client permits."3 That is, if the client permits
disclosure of certain pieces of information or disclosure to specific people,
then the attorney is allowed to make those limited disclosures. This is the
general rule that applies in the absence of any exception. Model Rule 1.0(e)
defines informed consent as "the agreement by a person to a proposed
course of conduct after the lawyer has communicated adequate information
and explanation about the material risks of and reasonably available alter-
natives to the proposed course of conduct.""
4
Model Rule 1.6 subpart (b)(1) states that "[a] lawyer may reveal infor-
mation relating to the representation of a client to the extent the lawyer
108 See id. at 14.
109 See HAZARD, KONIAK & CRAMTON, supra note 52, at 15.
110 See id.
ill Id. at 16.
112 MODEL RuLES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a) (2003).
113 See HAZARD, KONIAK & CRAMTON, supra note 52, at 270.
114 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.0(e) (2003).
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reasonably believes necessary... to prevent reasonably certain death or sub-
stantial bodily harm."1 5 This section is a permissive exception to the general
rule that attorneys shall not disclose information."6 These two sections
remain largely intact and have significant amounts of caselaw that support
their propriety in the courts.
The House of Delegates hotly debated adding subparts (2) and (3) to
Model Rule 1.6(b). The published 2003 Version of the Model Rules omits
subparts (2) and (3) because of the repeated attacks from critics saying they
would create a radical change that undermines confidentiality and candid
communication between lawyer and client."7
Model Rule 1.6(b)(2) reads:
[a] lawyer may reveal information.., to the extent the lawyer rea-
sonably believes necessary... to prevent the client from committing
a crime or fraud that is reasonably certain to result in substantial
injury to the financial interests or property of another and in
furtherance of which the client has used or is using the lawyer's
services. 1 8
This amendment follows the same spirit of confidentiality that most
courts have upheld in the past regarding prevention of a crime or fraud
when considering a potential future injury. 19 This disclosure is permissive
in nature because it is based on the attorney's analysis of what is reasonably
necessary and what may cause a substantial injury. The groundbreaking
change in this rule is the inclusion offinancial interests or property. Historically,
permissive disclosure has only been reserved for situations where people are
in physical danger. 2 °
Although Model Rule 1.6(b)(2), as amended, is important because the
rule includes financial interests or property rather than limiting the rule to
physical injuries, the amendments to Model Rule 1.6(b)(3) are more drastic.
Model Rule 1.6(b)(3) states as follows:
[a] lawyer may reveal information.., to the extent the lawyer rea-
sonably believes necessary .. . to prevent, mitigate or rectify
115 Id. at R. 1.6(b)(1).
M6 See HAZARD, KONIAK & CRAMTON, supra note 52, at 312.
117 See Monroe H. Freedman, Lawyer-Client Confidence: The Model Rules' Radical Assault on the
Traditional Role of the Lawyer, 68 A.B.A. J. 428 (1982).
118 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b) (2) (Aug. 2003).
119 See HAZARD, KONIAK & CRAMTON, supra note 52, at 288.
120 See, e.g., People v. Fentress, 425 N.Y.S.2d 485 (County Ct. 1980).
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substantial injury to the financial interests or property of another
that is reasonably certain to result or has resulted from the client's
commission of a crime or fraud in furtherance of which the client
has used the lawyer's services. 2
This amendment is a phenomenal step in two main respects: (1) the
amendment includes the above-mentioned new injury for financial interests
and property; and (2) the amendment is much more controversial than
Model Rule 1.6(b) (2) because the amendment can apply to past crimes and
past injuries (rather than future crimes). This is important because the
amendments allow attorneys the ability to disclose information not only as
a prevention mechanism, but also as a tool to mitigate and rectify any injuries.
V. CONCLUSIONS OF How MODEL RULE 1.6 IMPACTS
ABusivE TAx SHELTERS
If the tax shelter does not fit within the confines of registration or within
investor listing regulations, the IRS may determine that a tax shelter is in fact
illegal. The IRS may then issue a John Doe Summons to expose a listing
of clients who are using the tax shelter. In the past, accounting firms com-
plied with the John Doe Summons, and as a result, there was a ripple effect
through all of the clients using the tax shelter. Law firms have been opposed
to the John Doe Summons because the summons calls into question the
firm's duty of confidentiality to its clients. The fear is that compliance with
aJohn Doe Summons, whereby law firms expose client listings of all partici-
pants in a tax scheme, will undermine client confidence, integrity, and
candor.' 23 The new amendments to Model Rule 1.6 appear to create such
disclosure and openness of client information, especially for tax shelter
clients.
A. Analysis of Subpart (b)(2)
This section of the Rule focuses upon the point in time when a firm
such as Jenkens & Gilchrist is on the verge of effectuating the tax shelter for
a company because of the Rule's introductory to prevent language. 124 This
subpart focuses on prevention, which indicates that it would affectJenkens &
Gilchrist during a planning stage before the shelter had actually begun. On
121 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(3) (Aug. 2003).
122 See id.
123 cf HAZARD, KONIAK & CRAMTON, supra note 52, at 270-71.
124 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b) (2) (Aug. 2003).
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its face, the Rule seems to indicate that the firm should reveal information
regarding the tax shelter to the extent that the firm can prevent harm to third
parties-to "prevent the client from committing a crime." 12 However, this
Rule assumes that the disclosure of information by the attorney will stop the
client from engaging in the crime in the first instance. This is an inherent
contradiction because the attorneys are self-interested in closing the tax
shelter deal, but are now constrained to prevent that very tax shelter if it is
"reasonably certain to result in substantial injury to the financial interests of
another. 
26
In any case, the nature of the tax shelter sale places the attorney within
the purview of the Rule because the tax shelter sale is within the "further-
ance of which the client ... is using the lawyer's services.' 27 Therefore, at
first blush the new amendment to Model Rule 1.6(b)(2) would require an
attorney to place third party interests above and beyond both personal and
client interests. 2  But who are the third parties with financial interests?
Arguably, the third party is the IRS because the tax shelters are minimizing
the amount of income the IRS will receive from that particular taxpayer. 29
Another potential third party is any other taxpayer (be it corporate or
individual) that has transactions with the company based on the tax shelter
scheme. If these third parties are included, however, then there will often
be harm to their financial interests because the company using the tax shelter
is operating in a capital market where it hopes to maximize its own profits,
not the profits of others.
Additionally, the Rule is created to prevent crimes or frauds. 130 There-
fore, the lawyer must know that the shelter will either be a crime against
securities laws or other regulatory laws, or that the shelter will be a fraud.
Model Rule 1.0(f) describes knowledge as "actual knowledge of the fact in
question."131 Furthermore, Model Rule 1.0(f) states that "[a] person's
knowledge may be inferred from the circumstances." 132 This creates a
difficult position for the tax lawyer because crime or fraud knowledge will
likely be inferred to them in any case because of their unique expertise with
tax laws. Therefore, since knowledge can be implied, the tax lawyer must





129 See KLEIN ET AL., supra note 2, at 548-49.
130 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b) (2) (Aug. 2003).
131 MODEL RULEs OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.0(f) (2003).
132 Id.
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Technically speaking, the amendment drastically changes the face of tax
lawyer practice because a lawyer will be expected to disclose a larger variety
of transactions in an effort to prevent financial injuries to other parties. 13
Realistically speaking, the amendment does little to advance idealistic
disclosure. Weighing of interests is still left largely to the attorney, and the
all-important beginning of subpart (b) merely allows attorneys to reveal in
the language that states, "[a] lawyer may reveal. 134 The Rule's permissive
nature allows attorneys the opportunity to be persuaded by their own biases
regarding personal interests and responsibilities to clients. Tax lawyers,
however, should not feel comforted by this permissiveness. In the past,
some Courts, interpreting may language through a reasonable belief standard,
have required lawyers to disclose in certain instances.
135
B. Analysis of Subpart (b)(3)
This amended section applies to circumstances whereby the crime or
fraud by the client has already been committed as noted in the language
found in Model Rule 1.6(b)(3)-"from the client's commission of a crime
or fraud., 136 Historically, past crimes committed by clients are protected for
attorney-client privilege reasons because of the role the attorney must play
with respect to the past crime once the client decides to seek legal assis-
tance. 137 This situation is duly appreciated and remains intact according to
Official Comment 8 to Model Rule 1.6 that states, "[p] aragraph (b) (3) does
not apply when a person who has committed a crime or fraud thereafter
employs a lawyer for representation concerning that offense., 131
Here, the amendment was driven by the potential for (or actual result
of) financial or property injury. The rule assumes that an attorney's reason-
able disclosure will operate to prevent, mitigate, or rectify the harm (present
or future). 139 This goal of prevention or mitigation might not always be pro-
perly aligned with the remedy of disclosure. For instance, earlier this year
TVAzteca's lawyers were abiding by the disclosure requirements of the SEC
and Sarbanes-Oxley in an effort to help the company and its investors. As
a direct result of the disclosure, TVAzteca's stock fell 14.9% and its B-plus
133 See ABA House of Delegates Resolution to Report 119A, Aug. 11-12, 2003.
134 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b) (Aug. 2003) (emphasis supplied).
135 See McClure v. Thompson, 323 F.3d 1233 (9th Cir. 2003); Lucas v. State, 572 S.E.2d 274
(S.C. 2002).
136 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(3) (Aug. 2003).
137 See HAZARD, KONIAK & CRAMTON, supra note 52, at 205-9.
138 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (Aug. 2003), cmt. 8.
139 See id. at R. 1.6(b)(3).
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credit rating fell drastically.' 4 Although there was an eventual rally by TV
Azteca's stock, the situation is a good illustration of how disclosures can be
harmful to the company and investors rather than helpful.
Perhaps subpart (b)(3) is easier to apply than part (b)(2) because the
attorneys are aware that a crime or fraud has occurred-or that the tax
shelter is a crime or fraud-and therefore need to govern themselves accord-
ingly.'41 This crime section is intellectually conflicting because the client
must be using the attorney's services in furtherance of the crime, while at
the same time an attorney has a duty under the Model Rules to never use
legal practice to commit crimes.'42
As similarly noted for the amendment to Model Rule 1.6(b)(2), the
amendment to Model Rule 1.6(b)(3) could create a requirement upon tax
lawyers to disclose otherwise confidential client information. The driving
question becomes: which financial interests are material enough, so that the
tax lawyer must shift from his traditional duties to the client, and regard a
duty to third parties as more important? Also, whether or not disclosure
would actually mitigate or rectify the situation matters greatly.' 43 In other
words, the disclosure is contingent upon the lawyers' belief that revealing
the information will prevent, mitigate or rectify the damage or potential
damage; therefore, disclosure that does not (or is not reasonably expected to)
create any of these results will not be required.
C. Other Rules to Consider
The added Official Comments to the amended parts of Model Rule 1.6
also correctly refer the lawyer to other Model Rules that can and do apply.
The most troubling cross-referenced Rule is Model Rule 1.2(d).144 Ifwe can
assume that Model Rule 1.2(d) is working effectively, then the Rule
completely eliminates both amended subparts to Model Rule 1.6. Model
Rule 1.2(d) prohibits lawyers from counseling or assisting clients in crimes
and frauds, which means that those lawyers who find the need to disclose
under Rule 1.6 will also discover that they have violated Rule 1.2(d). 4 '
140 See TVAzteca May Face Downgrade in Probes, L.A. TIMES,Jan. 20, 2004, at C3. See also The Law
Firm of Laksy & Rif kind, Ltd. Announces Class Action Lawsuit Against TV Azeca S.A. de C. V., BUSINESS
WIRE, Jan. 28, 2004.
141 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b) (3) (Aug. 2003).
142 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) (2003).
143 See TVAzteca May Face Downgrade in Probes, supra note 140. See also The Law Firm of Laksy &
RiJkind, Ltd. Announces Class Action Lawsuit Against TVAzteca S.A. de CV., supra note 140.
144 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) (2003) (stating that a lawyer shall not counsel
or assist a client in committing a crime or fraud).
145 See id.
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Therefore, lawyers who follow 1.2(d) will never find themselves subject to
Model Rule 1.6(b)(2) or (3). The contradictory nature of this situation is
that the recent amendments to Model Rule 1.6 inherently assume that the
lawyers will be violating another Model Rule.
Another interesting cross-referenced Rule is Model Rule 1.13. Model
Rule 1.13 was also amended in August of 2003 and generally provides that
lawyers who have clients that are organizations must disclose circumstances
that are likely to cause substantial injury to the organization.' 46 This Rule
focuses on harms to the organization rather than third parties and now
requires disclosure (before the amendments the disclosure was permissive) to
higher authorities within the organization. 47 The amendments also declare
that disclosure is required regardless of the restrictions by Model Rule 1.6.14
In either case, considering many Rules together to contemplate the appro-
priate method and type of disclosure is important. Model Rule 1.13 is a
great example because the Rule deems Model Rule 1.6 irrelevant for
purposes of harm to the organization.
VI. CLOSING STATEMENTS
Tax shelter abuses are still prevalent in today's economy and they con-
tinue to be a hard issue for tax lawyers. The reforms on abuses that create
stricter registration requirements allow the IRS to get an accurate measure
of the potential for abuse. The reforms on taxpayer disclosures effectively
align the taxpayers' interests with the IRS's interests because of the risk of
penalties and other sanctions. Additionally, the reforms on listing require-
ments imposed on tax attorneys serve as an early alert to the IRS, and
provide the IRS with information to help prevent situations like those faced
by the four individuals in the Jenkens & Gilchrist case (disallowance of the
tax scheme used).
The federal securities laws have drastically changed the accountability
of attorneys solely by enacting the Act. This regulatory response to the
imbalance between liability of accountants and liability of lawyers accurately
follows public perception that lawyers have historically (and arguably
unfairly) been treated with more relaxed standards than accountants. The
issue regarding to whom the attorneys should disclose information will
continue to be debated between: groups that think noisy disclosures are
proper, and groups that think disclosures should be discreet to protect the
interests of the client.
146 See id. at R. 1.13.
147 See id.
148 See id. at R. 1.13(c).
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The ABA Formal Opinions have set the foundation for tax lawyers
operating in tax shelter situations. These Formal Opinions work in con-
junction with Revenue Rulings regarding the tax shelter schemes that are
not viable to give the tax lawyer a realistic idea of where the gray line on
abuse stands. More importantly, the ABA Model Rules of Professional
Conduct are making some pivotal changes to the conceptual role of the tax
lawyer. The traditional understanding of the tax lawyer as advocate and
advisor for the client, first and foremost, is giving way to a more societal-
based accountability.
On balance, the new rules do not adequately change the face of these
financial injuries which are preventable. John Doe Summonses are likely to
remain subject to the attorney-client privilege originally protected under
Model Rule 1.6. In order for the amended Model Rule 1.6 to be effective,
some infrastructure of definitions should be established. Definitions for
third parties, financial injury, and the level of reasonable certainly must be
created. For instance, one party's material financial injury may not be
material to another party. Additionally, financial injury can result from
many avenues depending on whether one is an investor, shareholder,
director, or the IRS. Third parties should be defined so that companies can
gauge stakeholders. For instance, third parties can include the government,
other companies, and individuals. Third parties might also include parent
companies, subsidiary companies, or brother/sister companies. Thus, these
current amendments will result in one of two outcomes: (1) a state will
adopt the amendments but enforcement will be futile, or (2) a state will not
adopt these amendments and try to strive for future amendments that can
actually work to prevent tax shelter abuses. In any event, the current
amendments will have no impact whatsoever on the policing of tax shelters
today until the provisions are adequately refined with an infrastructure of
definitions.

